Misalignment of Exchange Rates by Paul R. Krugman
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National Bureau
of Economic Research
Volume Title: Misalignment of Exchange Rates
Volume Author/Editor: Richard C. Marston, ed.




Chapter Title: Long-Run Effects of the Strong Dollar
Chapter Author: Paul R. Krugman
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c8062
Chapter pages in book: (p. 277 - 298)10  Long-Run Effects of 
the Strong Dollar 
Paul Krugman 
The fall of the dollar has now brought the U.S. real exchange rate down 
to roughly its level of the late 1970s. Against the yen and the deutsche 
mark, the dollar is at  record real lows. Yet  monthly  trade numbers 
continue to report near-record trade deficits. Although some improve- 
ment in the U.S. trade position over the next few quarters is widely 
expected, few who have studied the issue believe that the depreciation 
of the dollar so far is sufficient to bring about anything approaching a 
return to current account balance. 
Why does current account balance seem so unattainable, when the 
United States ran a current account surplus as recently as 1981? Pro- 
nouncements by Paul Volcker and some other officials suggest that the 
problem is inadequate growth in U.S. export markets, but this factor 
seems quantitatively of insufficient importance (see Krugman and Bald- 
win 1987). Congressional sentiment would like to blame the persistence 
of  the  U.S.  trade  deficit on  unfair foreign  trade  practices, but  few 
economists believe that these have gotten sufficiently more damaging 
since 1981 to account for the inability of the United States to restore 
current account balance. Business observers place weight on a decline 
in U.S. “competitiveness,” a blurry term that refers among other things 
to a declining U.S. technological and productivity advantage; as we 
will see, there is at least rough empirical evidence that indeed supports 
the view that declining relative U.S. productivity has contributed sub- 
stantially to the size of dollar decline required to restore a sustainable 
external balance.  Finally, we  are beginning to see assertions that a 
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large part of the U.S. current account deficit is “structural”  and in- 
sensitive to dollar devaluation. 
All  of  these explanations  seem, however,  somewhat like ex post 
rationalizations.  It  would  be  intellectually  much  more  appealing  to 
make the growth of the U.S. trade deficit in the first half of the 1980s 
and its persistence in the second half part of the same story. That is, 
one cannot help but suspect that the stubbornness of  the U.S. trade 
deficit in the face of a falling dollar is related to longer-term effects of 
the same causes that led to the emergence of that deficit in  the first 
place. Or to put it a different way: is there some way in which a large 
and sustained trade deficit gets built into an economy, making it difficult 
to return to trade balance? 
Now the idea that under certain circumstances adverse shocks to an 
economy produce  long-term  structural change has  recently become 
popular in macroeconomics under the name of “hysteresis.” (See Sachs 
1986 and Blanchard and Summers 1986). It has been argued that hys- 
teresis can occur in the unemployment rate if, for example, prolonged 
recession leads to a reduction in the capital stock, or if  workers who 
have been long unemployed either come to be regarded as unemploy- 
able or are excluded from the wage bargain. It is not difficult to imagine 
several ways in  which hysteresis might similarly arise in  the current 
account balance. A prolonged trade deficit might lead to a large foreign 
debt, and restoration of the current account balance will then be made 
more difficult by the necessity of paying interest on that debt. A pro- 
longed period during which a country’s tradable sectors are uncom- 
petitive may lead to disinvestment in those sectors, which may in turn 
mean that capacity contraints block restoration of trade balance when 
normal relative prices are restored. Finally, a prolonged deviation of 
a currency from its steady-state value misalignment may induce foreign 
firms to make, and domestic firms to abandon, invisible investments 
in market position, such as distribution networks and long-term cus- 
tomer reputation. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide both an overview of  theo- 
retical  reasons  why  a  sustained dollar appreciation might  lead to a 
sustained problem of international competitiveness and some quanti- 
tative assessments and evidence that bear on the issue. The paper 
begins by offering a simple measure of  the extent of sustained over- 
valuation, which shows that if  there indeed are long-term effects of 
sustained misalignment, then they are potentially of large magnitude 
indeed, Three main sources of long-term effects of a strong dollar are 
then considered.  First is the effect of the strong dollar on the U.S. 
international investment position, with the dramatic shift of the United 
States from the world’s largest creditor to its largest debtor. Second is 
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internationally competing and noncompeting sectors. Third is the pos- 
sibility that foreign firms may have invested (and U.S. firms disinvested) 
in invisible assets such as reputation and distribution networks, leading 
to a loss in U.S.  market share that cannot be regained simply through 
a return of the dollar to its previous levels. A final section of the paper 
pulls the evidence together. 
To preview the verdict: while there are a number of plausible reasons 
why a period during which a country’s currency is extremely strong 
might  require a  subsequent period  of compensating undervaluation, 
there is not much evidence that any of these arguments has in fact been 
operating very strongly. Despite the massive overvaluation of the dol- 
lar, U.S. debt accumulation will probably not be enough to pose sub- 
stantial additional difficulties in restoring a sustainable U.S. external 
account; there is surprisingly little evidence of a reallocation of capital 
away from tradable sectors, and there is no solid evidence of  the kind 
of  disinvestment in  invisible  assets that would  shift the U.S. trade 
balance adversely for any given real exchange rate. 
This does not mean that the United States faces no threats from the 
dollar’s prolonged overvaluation. The country has grown accustomed 
to living beyond its means, and the adjustment down to living within 
its means will be painful even if  there are no complications. Further- 
more, if  international  investors decide to reduce the amount of  U.S. 
debt that they hold willingly to levels comparable to those of six years 
ago, the United States will be forced into running a string of current 
account surpluses comparable to the deficits it ran in the period 1982- 
86, greatly aggravating the medium-term adjustment problem. Finally, 
the United States does appear to have suffered a major loss in com- 
petitiveness due to its lagging productivity growth, requiring a weaker 
dollar and worse terms of trade to  cope with foreign competition. How- 
ever, clear-cut evidence that the strong dollar itself has done lasting 
damage to U.S. competitiveness is surprisingly absent. 
10.1  The Extent of the Potential Problem 
We  will  be considering several alternative stories about how the 
strength of the dollar may have done long-term damage to the US. 
competitive position. Even if these stories are true, this does not mean 
that the United  States will  never return to current account balance: 
there is always some real exchange rate at which current account bal- 
ance can be achieved, and the budget constraint will insure that the 
dollar is  sooner or later driven down enough that the United  States 
begins to pay its way in international markets. The point is instead that 
if  the strong dollar has had long-run adverse effects, these will show 
up in the future path of the exchange rate. Each of the stories we will 280  Paul Krugman 
consider implies that a temporary period of dollar strength either per- 
manently lowers the steady-state value of  the dollar or requires that 
the dollar experience a period of compensating undervaluation to work 
off  the effects of its initial overvaluation. 
Figure 10.1 illustrates the possible senses in which a temporary de- 
viation of the exchange rate from its steady-state value might be said 
to have long-run effects. The figure indicates the initial steady-state 
real exchange rate as E. For some reason the exchange rate is pushed 
up temporarily. Most standard discussions have envisaged a subsequent 
path for the exchange rate like that illustrated as path (1):  a gradual 
convergence of the exchange rate back to its long-run level. The con- 
cern of this paper is with possible reasons why the dollar might instead 
follow a path like (2) or (3). In case (2) the dollar depreciates below its 
original level, settling into a new steady state. In case (3) the dollar 
depreciates sharply below its original level, providing the compensating 
undervaluation needed eventually to restore the steady state. 
Obviously it is crucial to specify the mechanism producing long-term 
effects of the strong dollar to determine both the nature of the path 
and the size of either the reduction in the steady-state exchange rate 
or the corrective undervaluation that will be necessary. All of the models 
suggested below, however, will relate the size of the long-term effect 
to the magnitude of  the deviation from steady-state values that  has 
occurred. As a preliminary step, it is therefore useful-and  somewhat 
awe-inspiring-to  contemplate the size of the deviation of the U.S. 
exchange rate from any likely estimate of its steady state during the 
1980s to date. Figure 10.2 shows a comparison of the actual U.S. real 
exchange rate (Council of Economic Advisors estimate; the CEA series 
uses CPIs as price deflators) with a rough estimate of  a steady-state 
value of the dollar from 1973 to 1986.  * The difference between the two 
represents the cumulative deviation from the steady state since 1980: 
a total of  187  point-years of  deviation. Some, though not all, stories 
about long-term effects of  misalignment indicate that the dollar must 
go through a compensating undervaluation equal in extent to its initial 
Exchange rate 
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Fig. 10.2  Deviation of dollar from steady state. 
point-years of misalignment. The extent of dollar weakness implied is 
startling. 
10.2  The Debt Burden 
The most easily measurable long-run effect of the strong dollar has 
been to transform the United States from a creditor to a debtor nation. 
The effect of  debt accumulation in  producing long-term effects of  a 
temporary  strong currency has  been  stressed by  Branson (1985) in 
particular. 
A reduced-form version of Branson’s analysis may be given as fol- 
lows. First, at any point in time the U.S. real exchange rate will depend 
negatively on U.S.  net foreign indebtedness, because as foreign debt 
grows, foreign investors will perceive the United States as increasingly 
risky. On the assumption that it is foreign debt relative to U.S. GNP 
that matters, we may write this as 
(1)  E  = E(d,z)  dElad < 0, 
where d is the ratio of foreign debt to GNP, and z is a vector of other 
factors. 
Let  Y  be the nominal interest  rate,  7~ the inflation rate, and g  the 
growth rate of the U.S. economy. Then the growth of the U.S. debt- 
GNP ratio will be 
(2)  d=  -b + (V -  7~ - g)d 
where b is the ratio of the noninterest current account to GNP. 
change rate. Linearizing, we can write this as 
Finally, the noninterest current account will depend on the real ex- 
(3)  b =  -P(E - E). 282  Paul Krugrnan 
Figure  10.3 illustrates how this small model works. On the vertical 
axis is the real exchange rate and on the horizontal axis the ratio of 
U.S. external debt to GNP. The line EE shows how the exchange rate 
depends at any point in time on the level of external debt. It is down- 
ward sloping because as U.S. debt grows, foreign investors will per- 
ceive greater risk and will demand a higher expected rate of return on 
U.S. assets. The line d = 0 shows how the exchange rate consistent 
with a constant debt-GNP ratio depends on the level of external debt. 
It is downward sloping because as long as the real interest rate exceeds 
the growth rate, an increase in the level of debt will require an increase 
in the trade surplus to avoid explosive debt growth. 
Now suppose that for some reason there is an increase in the ex- 
change rate consistent with any given level of foreign debt. This might 
result from any of the explanations currently offered for the dollar’s 
rise: a fall in  U.S. national saving that raised real interest rates, a rise 
in investment demand brought about by changes in tax law, an exog- 
enous shift in portfolio preferences due to renewed confidence in Amer- 
ica  or political  instability  abroad,  or a  simple  speculative  bubble. 
Whatever the source, the initial effect will be to shift EE up, say to 
E’E’. If the exchange rate is initially in equilibrium at point R, it will 
now shift to point S. However, over time, debt accumulation will grad- 
ually push the dollar down, as indicated by the arrows. 
What happens next depends crucially on whether the shift in EE is 
permanent. If it is, the system will gradually converge to a long-run 
equilibrium at point  T-that  is, to a new steady-state exchange rate 
that is below the original level. This would be a story corresponding 
to path (2) in figure 10.1. On the other hand, suppose that the shift in 
EE is reversed-the  speculative bubble that made foreigners willing to 
enlarge their claims on the United States bursts, the U.S. savings rate 
rises, and so forth. Then the economy will return to point R. To get 
there, it will have to experience a period of low real exchange rates so 
I 
d 
Fig. 10.3  Short- and long-run effects of portfolio shift. 283  Long-Run Effects of the Strong Dollar 
as to run trade surpluses large enough to work off the debt. Specifically, 
if  the initial shock comes at time 0 we must have2 
(4) 
That is, the initial deviation of  the exchange rate from its steady- 
state level, measured in point-years, must be offset by a subsequent 
deviation on the other side that, as long as r -  IT  > g,  actually contains 
even more point-years. 
How important are the long-term implications of the accumulation 
of  U.S.  external debt? The answer depends crucially on whether in- 
ternational investors remain willing to hold the stock of claims on the 
United  States they  have accumulated so far, or whether there is a 
demand for a return to the debt position of 1980. If  the debt position 
need only be stabilized, the debt accumulation, though huge in absolute 
terms, will produce only a small drag on the U.S. current account. If 
the debt must be worked off, however, the burden of doing so will be 
large indeed. 
Figure  10.4 shows actual and projected values of the U.S.  net in- 
ternational investment position as a share of GNP. From 1978 to 1986 
the numbers are actual (within the generous uncertainty of the data). 
From 1987 onwards they are based on the assumption of a linear return 
of the United States to current account balance, together with a com- 
bination of 2.5% real GNP  growth and 3% inflati~n.~  The United States 
can plausibly be expected to move from a net creditor position of almost 
4% of GNP at the end of the 1970s to a net debtor position of  12% or 
more by the early 1990s-even if the current account does adjust steadi- 
ly from this point onwards. 
Viewed in  absolute terms, the actual, and even more so the pro- 
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U.S. external debt as percentage of GNP. 284  Paul Krugman 
corresponding to the 1992 ratio of 12% of GNP is $700 billion.) How- 
ever, the United States is a huge country in an even-huger world. We 
need to be careful before getting alarmed about the size of  even an 
apparently overwhelming debt accumulation. If  foreign investors do 
not demand that the United States work off the debt it has run up and 
are content to allow the United States to stabilize its ratio of debt to 
GNP, then the debt buildup by itself will be relatively minor. On the 
other hand, if  international investors decide not merely to end but to 
reverse the buildup of  U.S. external  debt, this  would  be a serious 
matter. 
The relative ease with which the United States could stabilize the 
debt-GNP ratio despite the  size of the debt accumulation is readily 
seen. To keep debt from rising faster than GNP, the United States must 
run a noninterest current surplus equal to r -  IT  -  g  times the value 
of the debt. The debt ratio d was approximately  -.04 at the end of 
the 1970s, and may plausibly rise to .12 by the early 1990s; while the 
future of both the long-term real interest rate and the U.S.  growth rate 
is uncertain, centrist guesses might be .04 and .025. This implies that 
the real  resource  transfer  necessary  to stabilize  U.S.  external  debt 
would have been  -.06%  of  GNP had  there been no increase in the 
debt ratio since 1980, while it may have risen to  +.18% of  GNP by 
the early 1990s-a  net swing of about .25% of GNP (about $10 billion 
~urrently).~  This is not a negligible amount, but it is not very large. If 
this were the whole story, the U.S. plunge into external debt would 
have to be considered no more important a factor in external adjustment 
than, for example, the trade policies of foreign governments, which 
have been widely dismissed as of secondary importance by economists. 
Now it is possible that the direct burden of the debt will in fact be 
somewhat larger than this. Not all international claims consist of interest- 
bearing securities, and the rate of  return on other investments is sig- 
nificantly higher. In 1985 the United States, although it had a roughly 
zero net investment position, ran a surplus of $25 billion on investment 
income. This was at least partly because direct investment made up a 
higher share of  U.S. assets than of U.S. liabilities (23 vs. 15%). It also 
reflected the fact that U.S. banks accepted foreign deposits and relent 
the money at higher interest-which  may represent a miscounting as 
investment income of  services provided by the U.S. financial system. 
To  the extent that the growing debtor position of  the United States is 
financed in future by a reversal of the U.S. position as more of a home 
than a host country for foreign direct investment, the burden of servic- 
ing foreign claims may  be larger than would be calculated based on 
real interest rates for securities. 
Nonetheless, it seems clear that the direct burden of  growing U.S. 
debt, in  the sense that restoring a sustainable external position will 
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is in fact a relatively minor issue. This does not, however, mean that 
the growth in the debt is irrelevant. Similar calculations were made by 
many economists for less-developed debtors in the late 1970s and early 
1980s, suggesting that LDC (less developed country) debt should not 
pose serious problems. These studies turned out to be wrong, because 
they failed to take into account the possibility that foreign investors 
would revise downward the quantity of debt they were willing to hold, 
forcing debtor nations into rapid shifts into trade surplus. If there is a 
major consequence of the accumulation of foreign debt by the United 
States, it must be the exposure of the United States to a similar risk. 
Suppose that the willingness of foreigners to greatly increase their 
claims on the United States during the past five years turns out to have 
been a temporary aberration, and that starting sometime later in this 
decade the United States experiences capital outflows large enough to 
restore it to a positive net international investment position. The nec- 
essary concomitant of this restoration would be a very weak dollar. To 
work our way up to net debtor status took a massively strong dollar: 
from  1981  to  1986  the dollar was  on  average  31% above the level 
consistent with a stable net investment position.  There is no reason 
why  we might not now be faced with a period of  comparable dollar 
weakness. 
Now one might argue that such an extremely weak dollar will not 
happen because of the investment opportunities it would offer. A dollar 
so weak as to yield  large current account surpluses would offer an 
opportunity to buy dollar-denominated assets with the expectation of 
large capital gains, and this would tend to mitigate the dollar’s weak- 
ness.  However, after the experience of  the 1980s so far it is difficult 
to be so sanguine about financial markets. A cool appreciation of the 
long-run unsustainability  of a very strong dollar did little to keep the 
dollar from  rising to what  in retrospect  were thoroughly  unjustified 
levels in  1984-85;  there is no guarantee that the desire of investors to 
reduce claims on the United  States will not lead to a similarly large 
undershooting of the dollar in the years ahead. 
In summary, then, the growth in U.S. foreign debt does not pose a 
long-run problem for U.S.  adjustment in  the sense that the interest 
burden will make it difficult to achieve a sustainable balance of pay- 
ments. Instead, the risk is that the run-up of debt in the 1980s will now 
be run in reverse, implying a dollar as weak relative to the steady-state 
level as the dollar of  1985 was strong. 
10.3  Capital Reallocation 
A second possible source of long-term effects of the dollar’s over- 
valuation might be a reallocation of capital away from exporting and 286  Paul Krugman 
import-competing sectors. Press reports surely suggest that many U.S. 
manufacturing industries have retrenched or shifted production abroad; 
one would expect to find that this has been associated with a decline 
in the capital stock in these industries. To  restore U.S. trade balance 
may therefore require a period of rebuilding, thus requiring a compen- 
satory period  of  undervaluation to induce the necessary  investment 
movement.  There is  a good deal  of journalistic  evidence for major 
movement out of tradable sectors by U.S. firms in the first half of the 
eighties; not  only were there numerous complaints about  “deindus- 
trialization” and the emergence of the “hollow corporation,” but sto- 
ries about individual industries seem to fit the hypothesized pattern of 
shrinkage in the face of  competition. Again and again, restoration of 
profitability in U.S. industries faced with foreign competition is said 
to have hinged crucially on closing of inefficient plants. Thus it seems 
plausible that capital reallocation should turn out to be a major long- 
term effect of the dollar’s strength. 
10.3.1 
The simplest model one can set up of capital reallocation is one that 
draws on the specific factor models of Neary (1978) and Mussa (1974, 
1978). In this model a given stock of capital must be allocated between 
two sectors; it is costly to reallocate capital, so that capital moves only 
gradually to the sector of highest profitability. It would be more real- 
istic, of course, to model a capital stock that grows over time, so that 
the choice is one of the allocation of investment at the margin rather 
than an actual movement of existing capital from one sector to another; 
but the simple capital reallocation model is sufficient to make the point. 
Consider, then, an economy consisting of two sectors, one producing 
tradables and the other producing nontradables. Output in each sector 
is a constant-returns function of capital and labor. Labor is instanta- 
neously mobile between sectors, while capital can be reallocated be- 
tween sectors only at a cost that is increasing in the rate of reallocation. 
In order to focus on the issue of capital reallocation, let us assume full 
employment. Finally, in order to focus on the supply side, the trade 
balance will be taken to be exogenously given by international invest- 
ment decisions. 
First we consider the static relationships. Let K be the economy’s 
total capital stock; it is divided at any point in time between the capital 
allocated to tradables, KT,  and that allocated to nontradables, KN, so 
that 
A Model of Capital Reallocation 
(5)  KN  = K - Kp 
Let P  be the relative price of nontradables (which is one measure of 
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price will  move so as to clear the market for nontraded goods.  The 
supply of nontraded goods depends on their relative price and on the 
allocation of capital. The demand for nontradables will depend on their 
relative price and on real domestic expenditure.  However, domestic 
expenditure is by definition equal to national income minus the trade 
balance, while national income depends on the allocation of capital and 
on relative prices. Thus we can write a reduced-form equation for P 
as a function of  KT  and the real trade balance B: 
(6)  P  = P  (KT,B)  dPIdKT > 0,  dPIdB < 0. 
Also, the rental rate on capital in  each sector, measured in terms of 
the tradable good, depends on relative  prices and the allocation of 
capital. Since relative prices in turn depend on the allocation of capital 
and the trade balance, we can write the reduced-form equations 
(7) 
(8) 
PT  = pT(B,KT)  dpT/dB > 0,  dPT/dKT < 0. 
PN = pN(B,KT) dpNIdB < 0,  dp,v/dKT > 0. 
Now consider the pricing of capital in each sector. Let us assume 
that there is a given world interest rate r in terms of the traded good, 
and that risk can be ignored. Then in each sector the rate of return on 
capital, including capital gains or losses, must be equal to r. Let qr,qN 
be the prices of capital in the two sectors. Then we must have 
(9) 
(10)  = PN1qN  + qN1qN. 
r  = PT/ qT + qTlqT. 
Define q as the difference between the value of capital in place in the 
two sectors, qT -  qN.  Then it is immediately apparent that q will obey 
the law of motion 
(9)  dqldt = H  (q,KT,B)  with H, > 0, H2 > 0,  H3 < 0. 
Capital  will  be  reallocated to the sector with  the higher price  of 
capital. With convex costs of adjustment, the rate at which capital is 
reallocated will be an increasing function of the difference in prices of 
capital in place: 
(10)  KT = G(q). 
This defines the dynamic  system illustrated  in  figure  10.5. In the 
absence of any anticipated shocks, the allocation of capital will con- 
verge along the indicated saddle path. 
10.3.2  Effects of a Temporary Trade Deficit 
Now  suppose that  for  some  reason  our  economy  is  temporarily 
induced to run a trade deficit, say for N years. Suppose for simplicity 288  Paul Krugman 
Fig. 10.5  Dynamics of  capital reallocation. 
that the length of time for which the deficit will persist is perfectly 
anticipated from the beginning. Then the dynamics will follow the path 
illustrated  in  figure  10.6. While  the  trade  deficit  persists,  the  line 
dqldt = 0 will  shift  down, to the position  indicated  by  the  broken 
line. The capital stock allocated to tradables will therefore decline at 
first.  Some  time  before  the  end  of  the  trade  deficit is  anticipated, 
however, the capital in tradable industries will begin to rise again, so 
as to place the economy on the saddle path at the instant of transition. 
If we look at the implied behavior of the relative price of nontradable 
goods, we will see that it first rises above its steady-state level, then 
falls below that level, before eventually returning to its original level. 
Thus the capital reallocation  model implies that  a .temporary  strong 
exchange rate must be followed by a corrective undervaluation along 
the lines of  path (3) in figure 10.1. 
Need this corrective undervaluation be equal in point-years to the 
original deviation from the steady-state exchange rate? The answer is 
no: because the reallocation of capital from tradables to nontradables 
tends to lower the relative rental in the nontradables sector even at a 
given real exchange rate, not all the incentive to return to the original 
allocation of capital need be supplied by the subsequent undervaluation. 
However, the effect of capital reallocation on the relative rental for a 
given relative price depends, as Neary has pointed out, on the difference 
in capital intensity in the two sectors. If the two sectors were of equal 
capital intensity, there would have to be a full corrective undervaluation. 
This suggests that the actual undervaluation would have to be fairly close 
to full compensation for the previous overvaluation. 
The capital reallocation story thus seems to give a highly plausible 
reason why a strong dollar would have to be followed by a weak dollar 
before long-run equilibrium could be restored. However, the evidence 
on actual capital reallocation is puzzling and does not on the face of it 
support the view that the United States has in fact reallocated capital 
away from tradable production. 289  Long-Run Effects of  the Strong Dollar 
Fig. 10.6  Effects of a temporary trade deficit. 
10.3.3  Capital Reallocation in the United States, 1979-85 
It is a common approximation to treat  tradables  as equivalent to 
goods-producing industries, and nontradables as equivalent to services, 
on the grounds that goods are much more easily traded than services. 
Within the goods-producing sector, agriculture and mining have special 
problems that make it desirable to exclude them from the story. Thus 
the capital reallocation  story should be apparent in a comparison of 
manufacturing with service sectors. Indeed, the rise of the U.S. trade 
deficit has been matched one-for-one by a rise in the manufacturing 
deficit, and there has been widespread concern that international com- 
petition has been undermining U.S. manufacturing. 
Given these presumptions, it is surprising to discover that there is 
essentially no evidence of a reallocation of U.S. capital away from the 
manufacturing sector. Table 10.1 shows two measures of the allocation 
of U.S. investment between manufacturing and other sectors: the share 
of  manufacturing investment in  GNP and its share in total fixed in- 
vestment. Neither measure shows any notable trend. 
Table 10.1  Indicators of  Capital Reallocation: Fixed Investment in 
Manufacturing as a Share of GNP  and Total Fixed Investment 
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This finding is part of the broader puzzle of what has been happening 
to U.S. manufacturing. The perception of massive deindustrialization 
does not arise purely from journalistic hype: employment in manufac- 
turing has indeed been falling, with a I .4% annual rate of decline from 
1979 to 1985, compared with a 0.5% annual increase from 1973 to 1979. 
However, output growth has not slowed as much as one might have 
expected, given the surge in the manufacturing trade deficit: the growth 
rate dropped from 2.8 to 2.0% from 1973-79  to 1979-85.  Correspond- 
ingly, productivity growth has accelerated, from 2.3 to 3.4% ann~ally.~ 
It appears that the emergence of a manufacturing trade deficit has 
been accompanied by two other developments that blur the picture: a 
shift in the composition of domestic demand toward manufactures that 
has sustained the growth of manufacturing despite growing trade def- 
icits, and a surge of capital deepening investment. The shift in domestic 
demand may be due in part to the military buildup, and the change in 
investment patterns to the incentives created by changes in the tax law. 
Whatever the reason, it is difficult to find any evidence of a shift of 
capital out of the manufacturing sector during the period of the strong 
dollar. 
This does not, however, mean that capital shortage will not be an 
issue as the United States attempts to move back toward current ac- 
count balance. If the shift of demand toward manufactures turns out 
to be permanent, then a reversal of the manufactures trade deficit will 
imply that manufactures output will  have to grow substantially more 
rapidly than in either the seventies or the early eighties. One estimate 
puts the rate of growth over the next five years at 4.3% annually (Krug- 
man and Hatsopoulos 1987). To grow this fast, manufacturing will need 
investment substantially above recent levels-and  this will not be forth- 
coming unless the dollar falls sufficiently below its long-run level to 
make such an accelerated pace of manufacturing investment profitable. 
So there is still a case to be made that capital reallocation is an issue: 
if  the dollar had not been so strong, there would have been a shift of 
investment toward manufacturing, and we may need a weak dollar to 
induce this investment in future. However, the clear-cut evidence that 
one might have expected of disinvestment  in manufacturing is not there. 
10.4  Invisible Assets 
The market positions of firms do not depend simply on price and 
installed capacity.  They also depend crucially on invisible  assets of 
firms, such as distribution networks and customer loyalty. These in- 
visible assets, like physical capital, can be built up through investment. 
It seems plausible to suppose that such invisible investment is an im- 
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At a fundamental level,  invisible  assets like reputation should be 
treated in  the same way  as more tangible  investments. In practice, 
however, there are three reasons for treating them differently. First, 
invisible investment cannot easily be measured directly and thus must 
be inferred from its results. Second, since trade statistics  measure flows 
of goods, while the invisible assets of firms tend to  affect the perception 
of the value of these goods to consumers, invisible assets may show 
up as shifts in demand rather than supply. Finally, it seems plausible 
that in many cases investment in distribution, marketing, and so forth, 
has a  strong fixed-cost  aspect; a foreign firm must decide either to 
establish  itself in the U.S.  market, at substantial fixed cost, or not. 
These differing aspects suggest the need for a separate treatment of 
the possible long-term effects of the strong dollar that arise from foreign 
investment, and U.S.  disinvestment, in the invisible aspects of inter- 
national competitiveness.‘j 
Recently Richard Baldwin and I (Baldwin and Krugman 1986) have 
offered a model that captures the fixed-cost aspect of investment in 
marketing and distribution. The most important conclusion of that model 
is that there should be a quantum effect: large and/or sustained devia- 
tions of the exchange rate from its historical norm will produce sus- 
tained effects on trade, where smaller deviations will not. 
A  crude test for the presence of  such sustained effects  is to ask 
whether trade equations show any adverse shift in U.S. exports and 
imports compared with what might otherwise have been expected given 
the trends in more conventional determinants of the trade flows. Table 
10.2 presents some simple trade-flow equations for the United States, 
estimated for the period 1973-86.  The equations are in log-linear form, 
Table 10.2  Export and Import Equations 
Dependent 
Variable 
Export  Export  Import  Import 
Volume  Volume  Volume  Volume 
GNP  2.15 
(2.52) 
Relative productivity  -  1.14 
(1.32) 
(3.55) 
Relative pricest  -  0.65 
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with the dependent variables being the volumes of U.S. nonagricultural 
exports and nonoil imports. The explanatory variables are GNP in the 
United States or the rest of the world, a distributed lag on the price of 
the traded good relative to either CPIs (in foreign markets) or the GNP 
deflator (in the United States), and-crucially-a  measure of U.S. pro- 
ductivity in manufacturing relative to that of other industrial countries.’ 
This last index is necessary to account for the apparent secular decline 
in the U.S. real exchange rate consistent with current account balance 
during the 1970s; a theoretical justification for the role of relative pro- 
ductivity in the trade equation is given in Krugman and Baldwin (1987). 
The basic equations turn out fairly plausible, with price and income 
elasticities of plausible magnitude and relative productivity having the 
expected sign. However,  two of  the equations also include  dummy 
variables designed  to capture any structural  shift as a result of  the 
strong dollar. These dummies are zero before the third quarter of 1984, 
one afterwards; this somewhat arbitrary choice was made because it 
was in mid-1984 that financial markets seem to have concluded that 
the dollar could defy the laws of gravity indefinitely, and the final surge 
in the value of the dollar took place. Thus it seems a reasonable guess 
that firms making investment decisions would have decided to give up 
on waiting for a lower dollar at about the same time. 
The result is somewhat surprising: there is no evidence of an adverse 
structural shift. If anything, the equations suggest a favorable shift in 
export performance. Thus the worry that the strong dollar has per- 
manently impaired U.S. market position does not seem to be supported. 
If this is the case, why does the return of the dollar to its 1970s level 
not lead to expectations of a great surge in U.S. trade performance? 
The answer lies in the relative productivity  term: according to these 
estimates, it is the  long-term decline in  the  U.S. productivity edge, 
rather than the damage done by the strong dollar, that requires that 
the dollar fall well below its historical levels in  order to reverse the 
deficits of the mid-1980s. 
10.5  Conclusions 
This paper has reviewed  several reasons why  the strength of  the 
dollar in the period 1981-86  might have long-term adverse effects on 
U.S.  competitiveness. While it  is easy to construct stories in which 
sustained deviations of a currency from its long-run sustainable level 
do have long-term effects, the evidence for such effects in the case of 
the United States is surprisingly weak. The burden of stabilizing the 
debt-GNP ratio will not be greatly exacerbated by the rise in that ratio, 
because the real interest rate does not greatly exceed the U.S. growth 
rate. There has been no visible reallocation of capital out of the U.S. 293  Long-Run Effects of the Strong Dollar 
manufacturing sector. And there is no evidence of adverse structural 
shifts in U.S. trade flow equations. 
This does not mean that the United States will be able comfortably 
to return to the equilibrium of  1980. There may still be a shortage of 
capital in manufacturing as the United States attempts to restore capital 
account balance. The trade flow equations embody, through a relative 
productivity term, a secular decline in  the equilibrium real exchange 
rate that has continued through the 1980s. Finally, stabilizing the debt- 
GNP ratio may not be enough: if  international investors attempt to 
reverse their buildup of claims on the United States, the United States 
may be forced into a period of capital outflow and a correspondingly 
weak dollar-which  would be our version of a Latin-style debt crisis. 
Nonetheless, the basic message of this paper is cautiously optimistic: 
on the basis of preliminary evidence, the long-term damage from the 
strong dollar is less than one might have feared. 
Notes 
1. This estimate was derived as follows: the actual exchange rate in 1973 was 
assumed to represent a steady-state value; the steady-state value in  1980 was 
assumed to be 5% logarithmic above the actual; this reflects the widespread 
belief that the 1980 dollar was if anything somewhat undervalued. The steady- 
state exchange rate in fourth quarter 1986 was assumed to be 20% below the 
actual, reflecting a conservative guess about how much further dollar depre- 
ciation  would  have  been  needed  to stabilize the U.S. debt-GNP ratio. The 
intervening  steady-state rates were  then filled in by log-linear  interpolation. 
The decline in the steady-state exchange rate from 1980 to 1986 presumably 
reflects a combination of  slow growth of foreign demand and secular trends in 
U.S. competitiveness, as discussed later in the paper. 
2. If the debt-GNP ratio is eventually to return to its original level, then the 
integral over time of changes in that ratio must equal zero. 
3. The U.S. current account, which equals the increase in net debt, declines 
$28 billion per year from $140 billion in 1986 to zero in 1991. The nominal debt 
is simply the cumulative current account to each year’s end; the debt ratio is 
calculated  as this nominal debt divided by nominal  GNP, extrapolated from 
the 1986 GNP using the assumed inflation and growth. 
4. If  long-term U.S. growth should turn out to be 2% and the real interest 
rate 5%, the required resource transfer would double; if the numbers were 1.5 
and  6, it  would  triple;  but  even in  this  extremely pessimistic  scenario the 
resource transfer required to stabilize debt would not be overwhelming. 
5. A good  example of what seems to have been the typical case for U.S. 
manufacturing is the case of the tire industry, described in the US Industrial 
Outlook for 1986. There import competition led to closing of many plants and 
a 35%  decline in employment from the 1970s to 1985; yet the industry invested 
heavily in improving the remaining plants.  Real output, which fell 20% from 
1973 to 1979, was stable from 1979 to 1985. From the point of view of workers, 294  Paul Krugman 
this was an industry in decline; to someone who looked at either capital in- 
vestment or productivity, the industry was actually doing quite well. 
6. The picture  is complicated  to some extent by  multinational  firms, for 
whom the problem  is one of choosing a location of production rather than 
deciding whether or not to be in the market. However, location decisions also 
involve substantial invisible investment commitments, so that the qualitative 
behavior of trade flow originating from multinationals need not be very different 
from that originating from competing national firms. 
7. The index  is  based on interpolation  and extrapolation of  the relative 
productivity  numbers provided  by  Data Resources, Inc. (DRI) (1985), with 
foreign countries weighted by bilateral trade with the United States in 1984. 
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Comment  Kala Krishna 
Krugman presents a number of  models which cast light on the con- 
sequences of  the strong dollar. As he rightly points out, it would be 
Kala Krishna is assistant professor of economics at Harvard University and a faculty 
research fellow of the National  Bureau of Economic Research. 295  Long-Run Effects of  the Strong Dollar 
desirable to have the strong dollar of the recent past and the currently 
weak dollar to be part of the same story. The exogenous shift which 
caused the strong dollar should also be a reason for its current weak- 
ness. This is preferable to having both events be the result of unspecified 
exogenous shocks. 
He examines three models which try to do this. The first one focuses 
on the role of debt on the long-run effects of a strong dollar. The second 
focuses on specific capital and movement of such capital across sectors 
in  response to shocks. The third one focuses on the effects of  entry 
and exit costs on the long-run effects of a strong dollar. I shall comment 
on each of  these models and on the empirical evidence presented on 
the relevance of their insights. 
The first model is similar to that presented by Branson, and since it 
aroused a number of comments, I will not dwell on it at length. The 
basic idea in this model is that an exogenous shock occurs which causes 
a strong dollar in the short run, which in turn creates an increase in 
debt over time. This increase in debt requires a weak dollar to service 
the debt in  the long run if the shock is not reversed. If  the shock is 
reversed, then a weak dollar will  be required to run trade  surpluses 
large enough to work off the debt. If  the shock is not reversed, the 
increase in  debt does call for a weaker dollar, but if  the shock is re- 
versed, the increase in debt calls for an even weaker dollar to pay off 
the debt. Krugman then argues that  the former scenario should not 
cause much concern about the extent of dollar weakness required, while 
the latter should, on the basis of some simple calculations. This makes 
a good  deal of  sense. The question remains,  however, as to which 
scenario is more appropriate in the current context, and the paper has 
less to say about this aspect of  the dollar problem.  Speculations on 
this would be a welcome addition to the paper. Another point which 
could be made clearer concerns the motivation for equation (l), which 
postulates that an increase in the debt-to-GNP ratio, d, lowers the real 
exchange rate, E, at any time. The motivation given is that an increase 
in d makes foreign investors perceive the United States to be increas- 
ingly risky. However, little is said about what the risk is. It could be 
a risk of  repudiation-not  only explicit  repudiation, but  implicit re- 
pudiation by inflation. It might also involve riskiness due to possible 
consequences of attempts by the holders of debt to use it strategically. 
For example, a decision by the Japanese banks not to hold T bills would 
probably have a large effect on the market today, and concern about 
Japanese actions could raise the perceived riskiness of  U.S. invest- 
ments. The model in  the paper could be built upon to specify such a 
basis for such perceptions. 
The second model focuses on the reallocation  of  capital between 
tradables and nontradables implied by a change in the real trade bal- 
ance. The model suggests that an increase in the trade deficit will be 296  Paul Krugman 
accompanied by an increase in demand for nontradables, which results 
in an increase in the relative price of nontradables-that  is, an appre- 
ciation of the dollar. This causes a reallocation of specific capital to- 
wards nontradables. The shift in  specific capital raises the supply of 
nontradables, reducing their price. 
For this reason, an increase in the trade deficit which it is anticipated 
will  disappear in the future would result in an initial increase in the 
price of nontradables, p,  and cause a strong dollar. As capital moved 
across sectors to this nontraded sector, the price of nontradables would 
fall. The anticipated disappearance of  the increase in the trade deficit 
would require that capital be moved back to the traded sector. This 
would require an increase in the price of  tradables-that  is, an even 
weaker dollar in the interim period before the relative price stabilized 
to the original level. The basic idea in this model is thus that the strong 
dollar and the weak dollar were caused by  a temporary  exogenous 
shock which raised the trade deficit. The strong dollar was the result 
of the increase in demand for nontradables implied by the trade deficit. 
This reallocated capital to nontradables. The weak dollar was the result 
of having too much capital in nontradables when the shock disappeared, 
which required a reallocation of capital back into tradables and a weak 
dollar. 
Krugman studies whether we can see such a reallocation of capital 
between  services (KN)  and manufacturing  (KT)  in  1979-85.  He does 
not find such a reallocation in the aggregate data he looks at. However, 
it  would  be  surprising  if  the  reallocation  had  been  apparent in  the 
aggregate. It is likely that such evidence would only be forthcoming 
in a more detailed study. 
In addition, an implication of  the model is that Q = qT - qN,  the 
difference in  the valuation of capital in the two sectors, falls and then 
rises to fall again. Do such differences in the valuation of capital in the 
two sectors arise in the data? 
In order to be convincing empirically, a more careful industry-level 
study which identifies “open”  industries, is needed. It would also be 
agood idea to omit military industries from the sample, since the growth 
of  defense expenditure in  this period  could bias  the results, and to 
examine both  movements in capital stock across sectors and move- 
ments in the valuation of assets in the two sectors. 
The third model focuses on the effect of entry and exit costs faced 
by firms, on the long-run effects of a strong dollar. The basic idea is 
that once Japanese firms are in the U.S. market, a large dollar depre- 
ciation is needed to drive them out. Hence, if  a strong dollar caused 
entry of Japanese firms, we should expect to see a structural change 
in the import-export performance equations. Krugman tests whether 
a dummy variable, which is zero before the third quarter of  1984 and 297  Long-Run Effects of the Strong Dollar 
1 after this, is significant. He finds that there is little evidence of such 
a structural  shift. Once again, it seems unlikely that one would  see 
such a shift in aggregate data, and one should look for such evidence 
at the industry level, focusing on industries where such costs are likely 
to be significant and which have foreign competition. 
The drawback of using aggregate data in a country such as the United 
States which is not as open to trade as are a number of smaller countries 
is that the effects of trade shocks tend to be less obvious in the data.' 
This makes it important that aggregate evidence not be the only kind 
analyzed. 
Another reason that long-run effects of the strong dollar may exist 
might be related to recent work on pass-through or pricing to market, 
mentioned by Johnson and Loopesko in this conference. Imports may 
adjust slowly to a depreciating dollar if the price of imports on foreign 
exchange also changes so as to keep the dollar price stable-that  is, a 
pass-through of  zero.  The obvious point  about the  extent  of  pass- 
through is that a pass-through of unity is not necessary in any market 
structure, since exchange rate changes act like ad valorem taxeshb- 
sidies, and it is well understood that the incidence of such taxes rarely 
falls on only one side of the market.2 However, this does not have 
much to say about the long-run consequences of a strong dollar. 
The presence of'adjustment costs-such  as costs of hiring and firing 
labor-do  give long-run effects of  a strong dollar.  Such adjustment 
costs tend to have two implications. First, they tend to stabilize em- 
ployment by  making firms choose to employ fewer workers in good 
states and more in bad states. This stabilizes output, and if most output 
is exported to the  United  States, this stabilizes the dollar price.  In 
addition, adjustment costs make employment and output decisions con- 
tingent  on both expectations  about the future and on previous  em- 
ployment levels, which of course depend on the entire history of previous 
states. They  tend to create large regions of  inertia in the choice of 
employment. Thus, if a strong dollar raised the employment and output 
of firms exporting to the United States, only a very weak dollar which 
is expected to remain weak would induce such firms to cut employment 
and exports. For smaller depreciations of the dollar, employment, out- 
put, and exports by such firms would be maintained. Thus, a strong 
dollar, by adjusting upwards the existing labor force in firms exporting 
to the United States, would have long-run consequences by requiring 
very  large depreciations to combat low pass-through.  While simple 
models of  such phenomena exist, work in this area is at a relatively 
1. The ratio of exports to GNP in the United States is only about 10%. 
2. A number of such models are constructed in Krugrnan  1986, which also 
has several references to recent work in the area. 298  Paul Krugman 
immature  state, and  testable predictions of models with adjustment 
costs are only beginning to eme~ge.~  This seems like a very promising 
area for future research. 
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